Standard structures of information, in particular partition structures, are inadequate for the modeling of strategic thinking. They fail to capture the inner structure of hypotheses players make about situations they know will not occur. An extension of the partition structure is proposed in which such hypotheses can be modeled in detail. Hypothetical knowledge operators are defined for extended structures and are axiomatically characterized. The use of extended structures to model games with complete information is demonstrated. A sufficient condition is derived for players to play the backward induction in such games. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, D81, D82. ᮊ
INTRODUCTION
Finite games with perfect information are the simplest of games. Yet they seem to be the source of continuing debate and conflicting intuition. In particular, opinions diverge widely on the relation between rationality Ž and the backward induction equilibrium of these games e.g., Aumann, 1995; Basu, 1990; Ben Porath, 1992; Bicchieri, 1989 Bicchieri, , 1994 Binmore, 1987;  . Binmore and Brandenburger, 1990; Reny, 1992 . These opinions can be divided, very roughly, into three groups. Some claim that common knowledge of rationality is possible in such games and that it implies the backward induction equilibrium. Others maintain that it does not. Still others insist that backward induction is inconsistent with common knowledge of rationality or even that common knowledge of rationality itself is a contradictory term in such games. An adequate model in which we express formally what players do, think, believe, and conjecture could enable a rigorous formulation and comparison of these diverging opinions. The basic elements of the existing simple models that would seem capable of doing the job are the following:
Ž .
1 an information structure consisting of a state space and partitions of the state space, one for each player, which define knowledge operators;
2 an assignment of one strategy combination to each state; and optionally,
3 players' probability distributions over the state space.
In such models, which we shall call standard models, we can describe players' strategies, their knowledge and beliefs about others' strategies, their knowledge and beliefs about what others know and believe, and so on.
This paper, in a nutshell, disputes the adequacy of the standard model for describing games with perfect information and proposes a model which is adequate for this purpose. We show that standard models fail to capture an important structural aspect of strategic thinking and therefore leave unformalized many intuitive arguments that depend on it. The model we propose captures this aspect by giving a fuller and more faithful account of strategic thinking. Using this model we re-examine the relation between rationality and backward induction and give formal expression to statements about the reasoning of players in games with perfect informationᎏstatements that cannot be formalized in the standard model.
In the next section we explain in which way the said structural aspect of strategic thinking is not represented in the standard models and why it should be represented. For the time being, we shall explain what this structural aspect is. A strategy of a player specifies an action at each of his nodes in the game tree. When we assign a player's strategy to a state, this strategy specifies the actions of the player even in modes that he knows he will not reach in the state. The simple intuitive meaning of this is that such an action is what the player hypothesizes he would have done had he reached his node. This last hypothesis is a compound, structured sentence. It is formulated in terms of two clauses, one about reaching the node, the other about taking an action. This structure, concerning the relation between the clauses and the hypothesis, is absent from the standard model.
In Section 3 we present an extended information structure in which the relation between sentences expressing hypothetical thinking and their components can be represented. In addition to a knowledge operator, it provides for each player i a hypothetical knowledge operator that deter-Ž . mines for each pair of events, H the hypothesis and E, another Ž . eventᎏthat player i hypothesizes or simply thinks that if H were true, then he would know E. We define such operators axiomatically and characterize them in terms of hypothesis transformations on the partitions. In Section 4 we define models for games with perfect information. For an extended information structure to model a game, we assign to each of its states a play in the game, that is, the sequence of actions taken in the game. This is a major departure from the standard model, in which strategies, rather than plays, are assigned to states. Thus, the primitive notion here is purely behavioral. Strategies in this model are what they should be, namely, cognitive constructions. The strategy of a player in a state is determined by the hypotheses he holds about actions he would take in nodes were they reached. We show that a strategy combination in a state is uniquely defined and generates the actual play in that state.
Section 5 deals with rationality and backward induction. Here, rationality is a property of behavior, and when we say that a player is rational we simply mean that his behavior is rational. For a given state and node we Ž . say that the player at that node is rational at the node if: i the node is Ž . reached in the given state, ii there is no number x such that the player knows that his action there yields him a payoff less than x, and he hypothesizes that another action would yield him a payoff of at least x. A player is rational in a state if he is rational at each of the nodes he reaches in this state.
In our model, common knowledge of rationality does not imply that the path is the one generated by backward induction. To see this, suppose that in a certain state, which is common knowledge, the path is an equilibrium path other than the backward induction path. Rationality of the players in this state is determined by their behavior along the path. If players have Ž the ''right'' hypotheses there namely, had they deviated from the path the . game would have developed according to the equilibrium strategies then they are rational and there is a common knowledge of rationality.
To explain backward induction in terms of rationality, in our model, we need hypotheses about hypotheses about . . . about rationality rather than common knowledge of rationality. For this purpose we define common hypothesis, which is constructed iteratively, like common knowledge, except that hypothetical knowledge operators are iterated rather than knowledge operators. A common hypothesis, however, has more structure than common knowledge. The common hypothesis that if node¨is reached then e¨ent E holds true is the event obtained by iterating knowledge operators where the sequence of hypotheses is the sequence of events corresponding to the nodes leading to¨. The iteration ends with the event E. We say that node rationality is a common hypothesis if for each node¨it is a common hypothesis that if¨is reached, then the behavior of the player at¨is rational. In Section 5 we prove Theorem 5.3 which gives epistemic conditions that guarantee the backward induction play. To simplify the presentation we did not include in the model elements that could give a fuller account of players' reasoning and behavior. Thus, time is absent from the modelᎏwe analyze the game at a point in time Ž before it is played. We do not introduce into the model beliefs which . would be given by probability distributions over the state space . We do not foresee any difficulties in replicating the results for games with beliefs. Finally, we studied only games with perfect information, but we think that extended information structures are the appropriate tool for the investigation of games in extensive form in general. The intention of the previous discussion is by no means to claim that sentences such as ''If Bob's node were to be reached, then he would play d'' have no meaning. The opposite is true. Such sentences describe hypothetical thinking, which is essential to decision and game theory. We only claim that the standard model does not lend such sentences any meaning, since it takes them as primitive. There is nothing wrong with this, Ž since every theory must have some primitive notions such as actions and . payoffs in the standard model . We show, however, that by taking strategy as a primitive notion we fail to formalize the most basic ideas that relate behavior to rationality. Consider the following model.
WHAT STANDARD MODELS LACK
Model 2. There is only one state in this model, which is therefore common knowledge. The strategies in this state are S and S .
R r
Models 1 and 2 both describe a Nash equilibrium. We can easily explain the different behavior in these equilibria in terms of rationality. In Model 1, Alice knows that if Bob's node were to be reached he would irrationally play d, and being rational herself she plays D. In Model 2, Alice knows that if Bob's node were to be reached he would rationally play r, and being rational herself she plays R.
Ž . This explanation or any other involving Bob's rationality cannot be expressed in the standard model. Bob's rationality in Model 1, for example, is referred to in the component sentence ''Bob irrationally plays d.'' But the specification of Bob's strategy S in this model is not related, as we d argued before, to this component sentence or the corresponding event. All that can be said in Model 1 is that Alice knows that Bob's strategy is S . should be ''Were Bob's node to be reached, he would play d,'' since it is known in that Bob's node will not be reached.
To conclude from this that she knows Bob would behave irrationally were he to reach his node cannot be represented in the model. Now, the strategies in Model 2 are the backward induction strategies while those in Model 1 constitute another equilibrium. Thus we cannot account for the difference between these two equilibria in terms of events that depend on Bob's rationality, let alone common knowledge of rationality.
There is a way to overcome this obstacle and express the difference between the equilibria, in the standard model, in terms of rationality. To this end we have to adopt a notion of rationality which is radically different from the one we have been using until now. Instead of describing actions as being rational or not we ascribe these properties to strategies. Thus, instead of saying that if Bob were to reach his node he would irrationally choose d, we say that choosing strategy S , in Model 1, is d w irrational on Bob's part. With this definition of rationality, the event Bob x Ä 4 is irrational is just and of course Alice knows that Bob is irrational.
Ž . Aumann 1995 uses a generalization of this type of rationality to prove that common knowledge of rationality implies backward induction.
The difference between the two notions of rationality is immense. According to the first notion, it is always an action actually taken by the player, that is, behavior, which is judged to be rational or irrational. Thus, in Model 1, where Bob does not take any action, he cannot be considered irrational according to this notion of rationality, which is the reason we cannot relate the equilibrium to Bob's irrationality in the standard model. The second notion applies rationality to strategies, which are primitive Ž entities that cannot be expressed in terms of actual actions in standard . Ž . models and can be nonbehavioral and payoff irrelevant as in Model 1 .
In summary, the standard models are inadequate to express the outcome of the game in terms of player's rationality, when rationality is the elementary behavioral notion of rationality. This is not the only drawback of standard models. As with strategy sentences, no sentence expressing hypothetical thinking can be represented in terms of its components, in these models. Consider for example the following sentence S. S s''Player i whose chooses action a thinks that had she chosen action Ž .
b , player j would have known she, player i , was irrational.'' Such sentences are usually debated in the context of backward induction, usually as an argument against its justification. Unfortunately, using the standard model, we cannot test the validity of arguments concerning S, as S cannot be formalized in this model. That is, there is no way we can w x w x w define the event S in terms of the event Player i chooses b and Player x j knows that player i is irrational , for reasons similar to the ones given above. We could have determined the states in which S is true arbitrarily, in much the same way as we did for strategies, but this does not seem to be fruitful, as there must be some nonarbitrary relations between the event w x S and events describing strategies.
The conclusion from the above discussion is that an adequate model for games in extensive form must provide a way to interpret as events sentences describing hypothetical thinking in terms of their components. In the next section we extend information structures to facilitate such interpretation.
EXTENDED INFORMATION STRUCTURES
Information structures. An information structure, for a set of players I, is a list
Ž .
where ⍀ is the set of states, and for each player i, ⌸ is a partition of ⍀.
i Subsets of ⍀ are called e¨ents. The set of all events is denoted by ⌺. The set theoretic operations of complementation, intersection, and union are Ž . considered as the interpretation of ''not,'' ''and'' conjunction , and ''or'' Ž . disjunction , respectively. The complement of event E is denoted by ! E. Ž . We define a binary operator ''ª '' by E ª F s ! E j F, for any two events E and F. The operator ''ª '' interprets material implication Ž . ''if . . . , then . . . '' .
Ž .
For each state , we denote by ⌸ the unique element of ⌸ i i
containing . Using the partitions, we define knowledge operators as follows. For each i, the knowledge operator K : ⌺ ª ⌺ is defined by
for each event E. We usually omit the parentheses and write K E. The
Hypothetical knowledge. We want to enrich information structures so that hypothetical knowledge can be represented by events. For this pur-Ž . pose we define for each player i a binary operator K и, и such that for i Ž . any two events H / л and E, K H, E is the event that i hypothesizes i that he would have known E had the hypothesis H been true. We write H Ž .
The following definition provides a list of axioms that we want the hypothetical knowledge operator to satisfy. For the rest of this section we omit the subscript i in K , K H , L , and ⌸ .
is called a hypothetical knowledge operator if it satisfies for all events H / л and E, in ⌺, the following axioms:
The intuition behind these axioms is as follows. We think of K H E as representing a hypothesis of the player about his knowledge in a hypothetical situation H. Thus, two states of the player's mind are involved. One is the actual state of mind of which this hypothesis is a part. The other is a hypothetical state of the player's mind to which he refers in this hypothesis. In his actual state of mind, to produce the statement ''Had H been the case, I would have known E,'' the player has to probe a hypothetical state of mind of his, one that would have prevailed had H been the case. We Ž . make the following two assumptions. 
Hypothesis transformations.
In the previous subsection we formalized hypothetical knowledge by an operator on events. In formulating the axioms this operator should satisfy, we make no use of the structure of the state space.
We start with an informal discussion which motivates the definition that follows. In the previous subsection we did not formalize the notions of actual states of mind and hypothetical ones. Rather, we used these notions as intuitive guidelines in formalizing the properties of hypothetical knowledge operators. Now, we formalize actual and hypothetical states of mind, and the relation between them, in terms of the agents' partitions and then show how this formalization is related to hypothetical knowledge operators.
The player's state of mind in a state can be identified with his Ž . partition element P s ⌸ . This event describes completely everything that the player knows. Suppose now that P is the actual state of the player's mind. To find what he knows when hypothesis H holds true, the player must have in mind a hypothetical state of mind, which is another Ž . element in his partition. Let us denote this element by T P, H . Ž . Obviously, as T P, H is the player's state of mind when H is true, it should be the case that the two events intersect non-trivially, because Ž . otherwise the player knows in T P, H that H is false. In addition, if P intersects H nontrivially, then the player considers H possible and there-Ž . fore it is reasonable to assume that T P, H is simply H.
This leads us to the following definition. DEFINITION 3.2. A hypothesis transformation on ⌸ is a map Ž Ä 4. T: ⌸ = ⌺ _ л ª ⌸ that satisfies the following two conditions,
The following theorem shows that hypothetical knowledge operators are those operators that can be represented by hypothesis transformations.
Ž . THEOREM 3.3. Let ⍀, ⌸ be an information structure with set of e¨ents Ž Ä 4. ⌺, and K a binary operator K:
is a hypothetical knowledge operator iff there exists a hypothesis transformation T, on ⌸, such that
Moreo¨er, for a gi¨en hypothetical knowledge operator, there exists a unique Ž . hypothesis transformation T that satisfies 3.4 . DEFINITION 3.5. An extended information structure, for a set of players I, is a list,
where ⍀ is the set of states and for each player i, ⌸ is a partition of ⍀, i and T is a hypothesis transformation on ⌸ .
i i
In the axioms defining the hypothetical knowledge operator we use the Ž .
⍀ knowledge operator K. But by axiom K6 , for each E, K E s KE. Thus the hypothetical knowledge operator is an extension of the knowledge Ž . Ž . Ž . Ž . operator. Let K1* ᎐ K6* be the axioms obtained from K1 ᎐ K6 by replacing each K with K ⍀ . Add also the axiom
Ž
. Ž . Axioms K1* ᎐ K7* can now be used to axiomatize both the knowledge operator and the hypothetical knowledge operator, as follows. THEOREM 3.6. Let ⍀ be a state space with set of e¨ents ⌺ and K a binary
. there exists an extended information structure ⍀, ⌸, T , such that the ⍀ Ž . operator K и is the knowledge operator corresponding to the partition ⌸, and K is the hypothetical knowledge operator defined by the hypothesis transformation T.
MODELS FOR GAMES WITH PERFECT INFORMATION
A game G with perfect information consists of a finite set of players I Ž . and a finite tree with a set of nonterminal nodes or vertices V, a set of terminal nodes Z, and a root r. For each z g Z there is a unique path called play leading to it from the root r. With some abuse of language we call z a play when no confusion arises. For two nodes¨and u we writë U u or u #¨when u is a node that follows¨, i.e., when u is a node in the subtree the root of which is¨. The set of nonterminal nodes, V, is Ž . partitioned into subsets V , where V is the set of i's nodes. In the next definition we use extended information structures as models for games by introducing a function : ⍀ ª Z. We use the following notation for events that are defined in terms of . The event that node¨is Ž . Ä < Ž . 4 w x or to be reached, #¨, is denoted for short by¨. Note that w x w x w x w x Ž . s D a , and a l aЈ s л for any a / aЈ in A¨.
ag AŽ¨. The map specifies for each state the behavioral aspects of the state, Ž . namely what players do in this state i.e., which terminal node they reach . Using temporal terminology, shows how the game evolves in time. We intend the extended information structure to describe the epistemic status of the players before the game is started. It tells us what the players know or hypothesize in the beginning of the game about how the game will evolve in time. Note that, as maps ⍀ on Z, for each node¨, the event w ẍ is not empty and therefore can serve as a hypothesis for the hypothesis transformations T .
w x w x To understand condition 4.2 note that¨ª a is the event that ifŽ w x w x. is reached, then action a is taken there. Thus, K¨ª a is the event i Ž . that the player who can take action a knows that if¨is reached he takes Ž . there action a, or simply, he knows that he takes a at¨. Now, 4.2 says that if action a is indeed to be taken by the player at node¨, then the player knows it. Observe, however, that it is not true that a player who plays a in some state must know it. That is, we do not require that w x Žw x. a : K a . This is so, because at the beginning of the game, i may not i know for sure that his node¨will be reached.
A strategy map, which we define shortly, assigns a strategy to each state. It is constructed in our model using the hypotheses players have about their actions at all possible and all hypothetical nodes. In order to define strategy maps we need the following proposition. s .
4. We denote the event that i's strategy is s that is, s s by 
Since the payoff functions are nondegenerate, it is easy to show by Ž . induction that there is a unique strategy ␤ s ␤ which satisfies for
Ž . ␤ and ␤ r the backward induction strategy and path, respectively. DEFINITION 5.1. The event that player i is rational at node¨g V is i defined as
That is, i is rational at¨if this node is reached and i does not know of any bound x on his payoff, given that¨is reached, that could be hypothetically surpassed by using some action a. Note that rationality at node¨is a behavioral concept, as it applies only to states in which¨is indeed reached.
We want to find sufficient conditions in terms of rationality that guarantee the backward induction play. Common knowledge of rationality does not suffice. For example, if z is any equilibrium play, then it is possible to Ž . Ä 4 construct a state such that s z, is common knowledge and all players are rational in .
The following condition is stronger than the assumption of common knowledge of rationality but it is still too weak. The event that i hypothew¨x Žw x Ž .. sizes he is rational at all his nodes is F K¨ª R¨. Common
knowledge that each player hypothesizes he is rational in all his nodes is not enough to guarantee the backward induction play. The reason is as follows. Suppose that i is the player who plays at the root r. His rationality at r depends on his hypotheses of what would happen in each action he might choose. Thus, the important events to look at are of the form K w ax E, where i a is an action at r. Now the common knowledge assumption tells us that i knows that the player who plays at a, say j, hypothesizes he is rational at a. 
Ž .
Ž . Ž .
F g V
By the definition of common hypothesis it follows that a common hypothesis of node rationality depends only on the hypotheses of the root player. The reason that the hypotheses of one player determine the play of the game is as follows. Clearly, only the hypotheses of the root player, and nothing else, determine his action at the root. What he hypothesizes about Ž the consequence of his actual action at the root is knowledge since the . antecedent is true and, moreover, as the root player knows his action, the consequences are indeed true. But among these consequences are the hypotheses of the next player about what is true if his node is reached. Since the next player's node is indeed reached, his hypotheses are knowledge and so on.
Theorem 5.3 is of interest only if in some models of the game G, the event that there is a common hypothesis of node rationality is not empty. The following theorem guarantees the existence of such a model. 
Ž .
The lemma follows now by applying K4 to the last event. B
To prove the theorem we use the following lemma that states that if i's node u is reached and he hypothesizes that each of his actions leads to the backward induction node that follows the action, then he knows in which of these nodes he ends up. We denote Ž .
D i

Ž . agA u
The next lemma claims that if the player at u is rational and he hypothesizes that each of his actions leads to the backward induction node that follows the action, then the play ends in the backward induction that follows u. 
